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This paper takes an innovative approach to understanding Islamic radicalism and militancy by 
utilising charismatic leadership theory to understand the critical role of charismatic leaders in the 
evolutionary development of the modern Islamist movement's most radical and militant strains. 
The study of charismatic leadership, rather than focusing exclusively upon the individual leader, 
is concerned with understanding the complex interplay of social, cultural, historical, 
psychological and ideological dynamics that create a context conducive for the emergence of the 
charismatic leader-follower relationship. Consequently, this paper offers critical insights into the 
phenomenon of Islamic radicalism and militancy. To this end, I argue that the charismatic leader 
has acted as the vehicle for the evolutionary development of the more radical and militant strains 
of political Islam. To support this contention, I identify a chain of charismatic leaders stretching 
across the entire chronology of the modern Islamist movement, reflecting an increasing 
radicalisation and propensity towards violence with the rise of each leader. I argue that these 
leaders have emerged during ever present and intensifying perceptions of crisis within 
communities of potential support, due to the transformative charisma phenomenon in Islamic 
radicalism and militancy. This innovative and multidisciplinary approach to mapping the 
evolutionary roots of modern Islamist terrorism will reveal the critical factors at play in the 
evolutionary development of contemporary Islamic radicalism and militancy from its roots in 
Islamic modernism in the late 1800s to today’s ‘self-generating mini-groups’. 
Tracing the evolutionary roots of modern Islamic radicalism and 
militancy 
 
In a recent interview, renowned historian, Anthony Beevor, asserted that it was vital 
that the terrorism phenomenon be understood within the context of the universal 
laws of ‘cause and effect’. Indeed, at times of conflict and threats to security some of 
the greatest errors in judgment have occurred when this basic principle was 
forgotten.  This resulted in empathy, a critical ingredient in any successful approach 
to security, being discarded as ‘camouflaged sympathy’. Unfortunately, these errors 
are frequently made when confronting the issue of Islamic radicalism and militancy. 
However, it is only in recognising the role of ‘cause and effect’ and learning from the 
past that we can move towards a more nuanced understanding of the emergence 
and evolutionary development of Islamic radicalism and militancy. This paper seeks 
to do this by utilising charismatic leadership theory to understand the role of the 
charismatic leader in the evolutionary development of the modern Islamist 
movement. The study of charismatic leadership, rather than focusing exclusively 
upon the individual leader, focuses primarily upon understanding the merger of 
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social, cultural, historical, psychological and ideological dynamics that create a 
context conducive for the emergence of the charismatic leader-follower relationship. 
In this paper I argue that the charismatic leader has acted as the vehicle for the 
evolution of the modern Islamist movement’s most radical and militant strains. The 
identification of a chain of charismatic leaders stretching across the entire 
chronology of the modern Islamist movement, from Jamal al-Afghani of the 1800s to 
Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of today, reflects an increasing 
radicalisation of ideology and propensity towards violence with the rise of each 
leader.  This paper argues that this phenomenon is due to the Transformative 
Charisma Phenomenon (TCP) in Islamic radicalism and militancy, which is the 
notion that an identifiable chain of charismatic leaders emerges due to both an ever-
present and intensifying perception of crisis within communities of potential 
support and the ability of such leaders to build on the charismatic capital of their 
predecessors.  In doing so, the paper offers insights into the critical factors at play in 
the evolutionary development of contemporary Islamic radicalism and militancy 
from its roots in Islamic modernism in the late 1800s to today’s ‘self-generating 
groups’.  
Prior to delving into the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, it is vital to 
establish a theoretical framework for understanding not only the charismatic 
leadership phenomenon but also the process of radicalisation in relation to Islamic 
orientation. While word limit constraints will not allow an in-depth analysis of the 
field of charismatic leadership theory, I will present a generic theoretical framework 
of charismatic leadership theory to inform the remainder of this paper. Following 
this, I will present my ‘Model of diversity in Islamic orientation’ which will illustrate 
not only the diversity within Islam, but the transitional and rationalised nature of the 
radicalisation process between its ‘secularist’, ‘modernist’, ‘radical’ and ‘militant’ 
orientations. I will argue that the charismatic leader plays an important role in the 
process of individual and collective radicalisation and propensity to violence by 
acting as the vehicle for this process.  
An analysis and discussion of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy will 
follow, focusing exclusively on the evolutionary development of the most radical 
and militant strains of political Islam. Two important findings will emerge here. 
Firstly, the evolutionary developments of the phenomenon reflect shifting perceptions 
of crisis that correspond to the socio-historical developments of any given period. 
Secondly, as the perception of crisis intensifies, there is a parallel increase in both the 
radicalisation of ideology and propensity towards violence. This study therefore 
gives critical insights into the evolutionary development of Islamic radicalism and 
militancy from the modernists of the 1800s to the Islamist militants of today. 
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Charismatic Leadership Theory: A generic theoretical framework1
The ‘charismatic leadership phenomenon’ can arguably be traced back to the early 
stages of human social development. ‘Charisma has its roots long ago in human 
evolution. From the advent of symbolically-orientated behavior, charisma has 
existed as a latent potential in all social systems….’ (Bradley 1987, p. 3). 
Comparatively, the theoretical study of charismatic leadership is a more recent 
development, its origins being found most significantly in Max Weber’s Economy and 
Society (1968). Weber’s work has greatly influenced the study of charismatic 
leadership and while an in-depth analysis of his work is not possible here2, it is 
difficult to find a theory of charismatic leadership which has not been influenced by 
his work (see Bryman 1992; Freund 1968; Schweitzer 1984; and Shils 1965). While the 
field of charismatic leadership theory has moved on from Weber’s original 
conception of the phenomenon into a diverse and complex area of study, for Weber 
and the great majority of subsequent theorists, charisma is understood not as a 
personality trait but rather, the bond between a leader and follower that must be 
accepted for charismatic appeal to be generated and a charismatic relationship to 
form (See Bradley and Roberts 1988; Bryman 1992; Conger 1988; Eisenstadt 1995a; 
Willner 1968). It is the nature of the charismatic relationship that has arguably 
generated the most controversial debate in the field3 and it is this debate that forms 
the fault-lines which differentiate the sociological-symbolic approach4 from the self-
concept base approach 5 , or the psycho-analytical 6  from the social formation 
approaches7.  
While it is unfortunate that word limit constraints will not allow a discussion of 
the field of charismatic leadership theory, I now seek to offer my own theoretical 
approach to the charismatic leadership phenomenon that builds upon preceding 
theories of charismatic leadership while containing a number of original 
contributions to the field. There are two purposes behind developing a generic 
theoretical framework: firstly, to establish a theoretical basis for the remainder of this 
discussion; and secondly, to argue that a universalist framework implies that the 
emergence of a charismatic leader is not due to inherent flaws in the socio-cultural 
environment or the irrationality of the individuals involved, but rather is due to 
universal social dynamics. The five-point framework is as follows:   
1. The charismatic leader attracts followers due to personal attributes that are 
recognised by followers as exceptional and, as a consequence, he/she is 
followed with a sense of awe, hope and faith. Furthermore, charismatic 
leadership is a reciprocal, interdependent, empowering and rationalised 
relationship that develops between a leader and his/her followers. 
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2. While notions of heroism or great knowledge are attributes commonly 
ascribed to a charismatic leader, it is important to recognise that culture plays 
a crucial role in what attributes are considered exceptional in any given 
society. Consequently, cultural and socio-historical traditions and myths play 
a crucial role in the emergence of a charismatic leader. Indeed, charismatic 
leaders will both manipulate and emulate culturally specific myths, traditions 
and figures to empower both themselves and their followers by offering them 
a source of personal and collective identity, as well as to construct their 
image.  
3. Charismatic leaders will use not only rhetoric or the presentation of a 
doctrine, but the manipulation of modern communication technology as tools 
and techniques to generate their images, charismatic appeal and support. 
Ideology plays a central role in the generation of charismatic appeal for a 
leader and modern communication tools are frequently manipulated not only 
to spread their message, but generate charismatic appeal. 
4. The environment surrounding the emergence of a charismatic leader is 
characterised by the perception of crisis within both the individual and 
collective. While it may be possible to identify quantitatively the source of the 
perceived crisis (e.g. an increase in unemployment), this may not always be 
the case. In fact, a charismatic leader will often build upon, manipulate or 
even create the perception of crisis within the individual and collective. For 
example, a charismatic leader may create a sense of moral panic8 within both 
the individual and collective. The perception of crisis within a community 
feeds the notion within both individuals and the collective that established 
authorities have failed to recognise, deal with or alleviate the crisis situation. 
This results in an increased susceptibility to the emergence of a charismatic 
leader.  
5. The routinisation of charisma is inevitable due to the ephemeral nature of the 
phenomenon. While there is a tendency for charismatic leadership to be 
replaced by legal-rational or traditional forms of leadership if the movement 
is successful, the death of a charismatic leader poses a problem for the 
remaining members. Commonly, such a situation results in either the break-
up of the movement, the replacement of the leader by traditional means,  the 
designation of a new leader by the remaining followers or the charismatic 
leader before his/her death, or a search for a replacement through the 
identification of certain attributes. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise 
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that the process of routinisation does not necessarily signify the death of 
charisma. In fact, charisma may indeed emerge due to routinisation9.  
Diversity in Islamic orientation: Radicalisation and the charismatic 
leader 
As outlined in the preceding framework10, cultural and socio-historical traditions 
play a fundamental role in the charismatic leader-follower relationship. While an in-
depth analysis of the Islamic tradition and its sectarian, ethnic, nationalistic, 
doctrinal and socio-political subtleties 11  is not possible here, nevertheless, the 
following model illustrates the diversity in Islamic orientations, the process of 
radicalisation and the relationship of both to propensity towards violence - a crucial 
relationship within the context of the current investigation. Although offering a 
unique approach, the following model was developed drawing upon the work of 
David Wright-Neville (2004)12 and William Shepard (1987) 13.  
The diversities in Islamic orientations, even within one sectarian division (e.g. 
the sunni division), are too numerous even to attempt to articulate here when 
doctrinal, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and nationalistic nuances are taken into account. 
By Islamic orientation, I mean that complex of belief and practice which exists at 
both the individual and group level and may be differentiated between both the 
collective and the individual. This paper is interested in not only recognising the 
diversity within Islamic orientations, but also in understanding that diversity within 
the context of the differing perception of the role of selectively literalist 
interpretations of Islamic doctrine within the socio-cultural realm. Building upon 
this, radicalisation is therefore understood as a comparative increase and broadening 
in the attitudinal belief in the role of selectively literalist interpretations of Islamic 
doctrine applied to the public’s socio-cultural and political realm by an individual or 
identifiable collective. Consequently, a collective which believes that constructed 
orientation towards Islam is relevant only to the individual and should not be 
applied to the public realm will be considered comparatively less radical than a 
collective which believes that Islam should be the all-encompassing framework to 
govern all spheres of life, both private and public. Used in this context, 
‘radicalisation’ lacks any moral and ethical judgment and merely refers to a 
comparative assessment of attitudinal belief.  
It is necessary now to define four ideal categorisations of adherents to Islam 
that, while they do not necessarily reflect every potential orientation, nevertheless 
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aid in the process of identification, analysis and comparison of a diversity of 
manifestations. These categorisations are intentionally general and do not indulge in 
specific ideological nuances. The four categorisations14 are as follows: 
• Secularist: Secularists believe that there should be a separation between the 
realm of religion and politics. In other words, Islam should not act as a 
framework for shaping the political sphere. For secularists the role of Islam 
should remain purely personal. 
• Modernist: Modernists are defined not only by their belief that Islam does 
provide an adequate basis for public and private realms of life, but that it is 
also compatible with secular ideological perspectives. For example, modernists 
will characteristically claim that Islamic principles are compatible with secular 
philosophies of democracy and capitalism.  
• Radical: Radicals believe that selectively literalist interpretations of Islamic 
doctrine should play a crucial role in both the personal and collective spheres 
as an all-encompassing framework for life. For radicals, Islam as a framework 
for life is incompatible with any secular ideology. Radicals do not seek to 
impose this belief by personally engaging in violence.  
• Militant: Militants see it as necessary to engage in violence to ensure that their 
selectively literalist interpretation of Islamic doctrine is institutionalised 
without contamination from secular perspectives. Militants engage in 
terrorism15. 
These categorisations have been applied to the spectrum below. The further right 
one moves along the spectrum represents an increasing perception of the need to 
apply selectively literalist interpretations of Islam to the socio-cultural realm. Hence, 
the further along the spectrum one moves, the more comparatively radical the 
individual or collective becomes. Due to the generalised nature of the categorisations 
and the position of these categorisations on a spectrum, the transitory nature of the 
radicalisation process is most effectively illustrated. Hence, an individual may move 
along the spectrum from a modernist perspective towards a radical perspective as 
their perception of the growing need to apply Islam to the socio-cultural spheres 
increases. This process of radicalisation is inevitably coupled with a growing 
perception of crisis related to the perceived divergence between their perception of the 
role of Islam in the socio-cultural realm and the manifestation of that perception in 
reality. Nevertheless, due to the growing perception of crisis that inevitably leads to 
radicalisation of the individual or collective in question, a growing propensity 
towards violence also occurs. The charismatic leader inevitably plays a pivotal role 
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in the process of radicalisation by both highlighting and accentuating perceptions of 
crisis and offering an alternative based upon religious adherence. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Model of Diversity in Islamic Orientation 
 
 
 
Ultimately, this model seconds as a framework within which to understand not just 
the radicalisation of religious adherents, but the emergence of religious terrorism. As 
adherents pass through the spectrum, and the process of radicalisation becomes 
more extreme as the associated perception of crisis becomes more severe, so to does 
the individual’s propensity towards violence increase. As Sprinzak argues,  
What terrorists do - and other radicals do not - is to bring their rejection of the 
regime’s legitimacy to the point of challenging it with unconventional 
violence. However, since terrorism never emerges overnight, this crisis of 
legitimacy unfolds through a prolonged process of delegitimation of the 
established society and the regime (Sprinzak 1991, pp. 51-52). 
This is, in essence, the process that the model below illustrates: the process by which 
religious terrorism emerges. Juergensmeyer suggests that ‘…the perception that the 
problem with politics is, at some level, religious…. Means “religionising” politics… 
in two ways: by showing that political difficulties have a religious cause, and that 
religious goals have a political solution’ (Juergensmeyer 1991). The charismatic 
leader plays a catalytic role in the radicalisation process by highlighting, 
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accentuating or even creating the perception of crisis within an individual or group. 
James Piscatori argues that the disparity between reality and the Islamic ideal 
‘…tends to become greater and the disappointment more acute in times of rapid 
change’ (Piscatoro 1986, p. 21). It is during periods of socio-economic, political and 
cultural breakdown in Islamic societies that Islamist charismatic leaders typically 
rise to prominence. This tendency will be explicitly exhibited in the following 
analysis of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. 
Charismatic leadership and the transformative charisma phenomenon 
in Islamic radicalism and militancy: Tracing the roots of contemporary 
Islamist militancy 
Charismatic leaders of Islamist radical and terrorist groups selectively use the 
traditions, teachings and values of Islam to not only legitimise their actions and the 
actions of their followers, but to shape the cognitive perceptions of their followers 
regarding both themselves and the world around them. Muslims, like adherents to 
any religious tradition or even secular citizens, raise ideological questions in times of 
rapid and intense socio-cultural change in an attempt to understand the world 
around them. Inevitably, charismatic leaders tend to arise in Islamic societies in 
similar situations. Because Islam does not have a single, hierarchically-based clerical 
leadership, as, for instance, in the Catholic Church, it tends to have more space for 
the emergence of charismatic individuals in such times16. Furthermore, in Islam 
there are certain ideological concepts, for example ijtihad (independent interpretation 
of Islamic doctrine), jihad (struggle) and tajdid (renewal), which ideologically gears 
the religion for a continual process of renewal and reform in the face of change and 
adversity17. The picture that emerges is of a religion that not only fosters charismatic 
leadership 18 , but makes fertile the socio-cultural environment for the rise of 
charismatic individuals. While the emergence of individual charismatic leaders 
throughout the modern Islamist movement can be explained by identifying the 
existence of the factors and characteristics specified in the theoretical framework of 
charismatic leadership established earlier, this does not explain how an identifiable 
chain of charismatic Islamist leaders has emerged, stretching from the 1800s into the 
2000s. 
Throughout the entire chronological development of the modern Islamist 
movement a chain of charismatic leaders, stretching from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
(1838-97), arguably the father of the modern Islamist movement, to Osama bin Laden 
Ingram, H (2007/8) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform    510 
and beyond, is indicative of the presence of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and 
militancy19. The TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy is essentially a type of 
routinisation and refers to the notion that a series of charismatic leaders have 
emerged throughout the chronological development of the modern Islamist 
movement by building upon the charisma, ideology and leadership qualities of 
preceding Islamist leaders. Tracing this phenomenon towards the emergence of 
Islamist militancy (Islamic terrorism) will be the focus of the remainder of this paper. 
What will emerge is that it is impossible to understand the rise of each leader outside 
of the socio-historical conditions of the time. Indeed, it is in reaction to these socio-
historical conditions that the charismatic leader emerges and constructs his image. 
Ideology plays a pivotal role in the construction of this image and their ideological 
nuances are inevitably in response to the socio-historical reality of the time. So, while 
such charismatic leaders build upon the charismatic capital of their predecessors, the 
charismatic leader-follower relationship will emerge only if they can develop their 
own ideological nuances and charismatic image in response to socio-historical 
conditions unique to their time. Consequently, the most effective way to map the 
dynamics of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy is within the context of 
distinct historical phases. 
The Colonialism Period (late-1800s to 1945): Egypt 
The decline of the Islamic empires and the ascendancy of Europe provided the 
backdrop for the birth of the modern Islamist movement. As Wilfred Smith argues:  
The fundamental malaise of modern Islam is a sense that something has gone 
wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modern Muslims is 
how to rehabilitate that history, to get it going again in full vigor, so that 
Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely guided society should 
and must. The fundamental spiritual crisis of Islam in the twentieth century 
stems from an awareness that something is awry between the religion which 
God has appointed and the historical development of the world which He 
controls (Smith 1961, pp. 47-48). 
The general consensus within the field is that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) 
was the founder of the modern Islamist movement. It is Afghani who encouraged 
the re-opening of the doors of ijtihad in the late 1800s and played a pivotal role in the 
emergence of Islamic modernism by instigating and encouraging political activism.  
Afghani's influence throughout the Middle East, but particularly in Egypt, was 
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immense and, while he mentored many prominent individuals, it was Muhammad 
Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) who continued the work of their 
mentor after his death in 1897.  
Afghani, Abduh and Rida were Islamic modernists who believed that to revive 
the Islamic world it was important to draw upon and learn from Europe while 
staying true to their Islamic values. However, the inability of Islamic modernists to 
find a universally accepted middle-ground between traditional Islamic values and 
the advancements of the West, coupled with the socio-historical environment of the 
time, caused a significant shift away from a perceived need to emulate and draw 
upon the West. By the 1920s, Rida had evolved away from his predecessors and was 
espousing an ideology that called for the rejection of the West and a return to Islam 
as an all-encompassing framework for human existence20. This ideological shift is 
significant because it represents the earliest move towards the more radical reformist 
movements.  It is significant to note that, while Afghani, Abduh and Rida certainly 
published and lectured widely to ‘the masses’, they are differentiated from those 
whom they preceded in that they focused a great deal of their efforts upon directly 
influencing, and even advising, those in power. This shift regarding ‘target audience’ 
and ‘sphere of influence’ is critical when tracing the evolution of Islamic radicalism 
and militancy. In fact, one of Rida’s disciples, who would go on to be the founder of 
modern Islamic radicalism, would not only take Rida’s ideology and develop it 
further, but would be catalytic in this shift. This individual was Hassan al-Banna21 
(1906-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood22.  
When tracing the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, al-Banna emerges as 
a critical individual in the chain. Two critical evolutionary developments manifest in 
al-Banna: firstly, al-Banna argued that Islam must be made the central guiding force 
for all aspects of human life; second, jihad played a central role in al-Banna's 
ideology. These two developments, which represent a radicalisation in Islamist 
ideology, reflect an increasing perception of crisis within Egyptian society regarding 
the failures of indigenous authority to achieve independence from their British 
colonialists. The influence of the British occupiers not only stunted Egypt's 
development politically and economically, but many believed that their presence 
was destroying Egypt, both culturally and morally. Indeed, socio-economic and 
socio-political hardship appears to be a secondary, even latent, environmental 
characteristic of the context from which the charismatic leaders emerge. Rather, the 
primary factor appears to be the perception of socio-cultural crisis and this anxiety is 
accentuated by more ‘tangible’ factors, such as unemployment. The ideology of al-
Banna not only reflected these sentiments, but accentuated them while offering his 
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audience a solution23. It is little surprise then, that al-Banna’s Brotherhood derived 
most of its membership and support from Egypt’s new ‘urban class’. As thousands 
of Egyptians migrated from rural to urban zones, it was the Muslim Brotherhood 
who aided in their transition by offering social welfare facilities and services that the 
Egyptian government could not offer. With Egypt in a state of social, political, 
cultural and economic crisis, the Muslim Brotherhood would emerge as the most 
popular organisation in the region.   
Organisationally the Muslim Brotherhood would become the prototype for 
many subsequent Islamic reformist and terrorist organisations. Most critical to this 
investigation is the emergence of the charismatic leader as the ‘figure head’ or image 
of the organisation. Furthermore, a number of important individuals would emerge 
from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, arguably the most influential being Sayyid 
Qutb (1906-1966)24.  
The post-Colonialism or Nationalist Period (1945-1966): Egypt 
After centuries of colonialism and decades of anti-colonialist struggle, the Nasser 
regime emerged as the first truly indigenous government of Egypt in 1952. The 
period immediately after World War II was characterised by a wave of nationalist, 
anti-colonialist independence movements emerging throughout the Middle East, 
Africa and Asia. In Egypt, after decades of struggle for independence and freedom 
from the influence of Europe, the Nasser regime came to power with the assistance 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the Muslim Brotherhood were soon viewed 
as a threat by Nasser and were banned and brutally repressed. Many of the 
Brotherhood's members were forced into exile, imprisoned and tortured or killed. 
The physical, emotional and political betrayal was surpassed only by the symbolic 
one in its impact. The fact that after decades of struggle, an indigenous government 
would ‘abandon’ Islam for ‘godless socialism’ was viewed as an abhorrence. The 
ideological radicalisation that materialised from this period is encapsulated in the 
ideology of Qutb25. 
Qutb’s ideology, particularly his ‘prison writings’, gained a pertinence in 
radical and militant circles in the ‘Modern Period’ because it reflected an almost 
universal experience of disappointment with indigenous governments. Qutb’s 
seminal work, Milestones, represents the ideological manifestation of the cumulative 
product of Qutb’s life experiences. Qutb, like al-Banna, was part of the mass rural-
urban migration which saw Cairo’s population triple in the first few decades of the 
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twentieth century. While al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in response to 
his experiences of poverty, socio-economic disparity and colonialism, Qutb was an 
active member of the predominantly secular Wafd and Sa’adist Party. It was not 
until the 1940s that Islamic ideology began to permeate significantly into Qutb’s 
writings26. Prior to this point, the secularly educated Qutb was a poet and literary 
critic. However, as Qutb turned to Islam in a period of intense social, political, 
cultural and economic hardship, which was accentuated by World War II as well as 
personal crises27, he did not join the Brotherhood until the early 1950s. In fact, Qutb 
played a critical role in the success of the July 1952 Revolution and was a trusted 
associate of Nasser and the Free Officers. However, by 1954 Qutb was imprisoned by 
the Nasser regime and eventually executed in 1966. 
As noted previously, an in-depth analysis of Qutbist ideological principles is 
not possible here. However it is important to highlight the major ideological 
elements of Qutb’s ideology in comparison to those of his predecessors. The central 
argument of Qutb’s Milestones is that all modern societies are jahiliyya (the period of 
ignorance in pre-Islam Arabia) and an essentially covert vanguard needs to be 
established to ‘re-assert’ true Islam back into society. While Qutb argued that this 
should be achieved via ‘grassroots’ engagement, he also argued that violent jihad 
had an important role to play. For Qutb, jihad was a constant fixture in society and 
was not for purely defensive purposes. The radicalisation evident in Qutb’s 
ideology, when compared to Afghani, Abduh, Ridah and even al-Banna, must be 
understood within the context of socio-historical conditions specific to the ‘post-
Colonial’ period. Qutb’s ideology reflects not only an increasing emphasis upon 
jihad, but also an increasing perception that the disparity between reality and the 
Islamic ideal is so wide, and the broader society and its leaders so inherently ‘un-
Islamic’ (even ’anti-Islamic’) that sweeping ideological, political, cultural and 
organisational changes need to be made. Hence in the ideology of Qutb can be found 
the shift from the foundationalist ideological approach of his predecessors28, to the 
socio-humanist approach. While the former argues that the most effective program for 
change is overtly engaging in the society and directly or indirectly participating in 
the political process, the latter argues that the wider society and its leadership are 
inherently ‘un-Islamic’ and therefore clandestine entities need to be established to 
reassert Islam into society. While Qutb's ideology emerged from the circumstances 
that characterised the ‘Post-Colonialist Period’, his charismatic appeal exploded in 
the ‘Modern Period’ of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. In Qutb’s 
ideology contemporary Islamic militants discovered an explanation and solution to 
their perception of crisis. In Qutb’s life they saw reflections of their own experiences 
and the legitimacy that comes with martyrdom. 
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The Modern Period (late 1960s to present) 
Qutb's execution in 1966 passed with superficial acknowledgement from the rest of 
the world. For almost two decades, political Islam was practically abandoned in the 
name of Nasser’s pan-Arabism. However, the shock of defeat in the 1967 Six Day 
War, and the inevitable questioning that emerges in times of crisis, instigated a 
revival of Islam. In countries throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia the 
broken promises of indigenous nationalist movements, all of which inevitably 
emerged as bastardised socialist or democratic governments, left a feeling of 
bitterness and resentment towards not only their own governments, but the two 
Cold War superpowers. The ‘Modern Period’ is consequently characterised by a 
resurgence of Islam. As part of this Islamic resurgence, the more radical and militant 
Islamic groups have risen to particular prominence. Again, the heightened 
perception of crisis emerges due to the perceived need to return to Islam as a 
solution to the aftermath of failed ‘secular governments’.  
The personnel in this resurgence of radical and militant political Islam in the 
modern period emerged primarily from the tertiary educated, religiously pious 
middle class. This is not a manifestation of chance but a reflection of the complex 
interplay of social, economic, political, cultural and ideological factors that explicitly 
exhibits the tendency of radical and militant Islamism to emerge from the void 
between reality and hope. The failure of bastardised indigenous governments to 
deliver on the hopes that their promises encouraged in populations struggling to 
emerge from decades, even centuries, of colonialism was felt most bitterly by the 
new, educated class of the developed world, whose visions for their personal lives 
and the hopes for their society simply did not eventuate.  It would be charismatic 
leaders such as Abdullah Azzam, Muhammad Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri and 
Mohammad Faraj who would build upon the ideology and charismatic appeal of 
Sayyid Qutb and continue the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy throughout 
the remainder of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. It is these 
charismatic ideologues who would be catalytic to the emergence of Islamic militancy 
(terrorism).  
It is possible to identify three types of charismatic leadership in contemporary 
Islamist terrorist organisations; charismatic leaders, neo-charismatic leaders and spiritual 
guides. It must be emphasised that these are idealised typologies designed to help 
explain manifestations of charismatic leadership in Islamist terrorist groups and are, 
by no means, the only manifestations of leadership in Islamic militancy. While word 
constraints will not allow an in-depth analysis of the spiritual guide type, suffice to 
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say that their emergence is a manifestation of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and 
militancy. Spiritual guides are characterised by their ability to subtly (or so it is 
perceived by outsiders) and indirectly encourage their supporters to engage in acts 
of terrorism. This is typically achieved through their ideological rhetoric. Arguably 
the most prominent spiritual guide type is Abu Bakr Bashir. The charismatic leader type, 
however, is a unique evolutionary step in the TCP in Islamic radicalism and 
militancy. While charismatic leaders of the ‘Colonialist’ and ‘Post-
Colonialist/Nationalist’ periods were first and foremost ideologues, the charismatic 
leader type not only encourages, but facilitates terrorist violence. This type of 
charismatic leadership in Islamic terrorism is epitomised by Osama bin Laden29 and 
his emergence can be understood within the context of the TCP in Islamic radicalism 
and militancy. Specifically, one of bin Laden's ideological mentors at King Abdul 
Aziz University was Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb 30 . Yet the 
ideology which bin Laden espouses is a significant evolutionary step from his 
predecessors. Bin Laden's rhetoric calls for an international jihad where there is no 
differentiation between civilians and military combatants. Furthermore, bin Laden 
not only encourages, but facilitates the use of terrorist violence. Once again, the 
increasing ideological radicalisation reflected in bin Laden's rhetoric mirrors a 
heightened and more intensified perception of crisis in his communities of potential 
support. While there is no room for even a brief discussion of other charismatic leader 
types, such as Sheikh Yassin and Omar Abdel Rahman, by continuing to trace the 
TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy, a far newer and deadlier manifestation of 
charismatic leadership in Islamist terrorist groups emerges: the neo-charismatic leader 
type. 
While the emergence of the charismatic leader phenomenon in Islamist terrorism 
reflects an evolutionary step from the charismatic leaders of the ‘Colonial’ and ‘Post-
Colonial/Nationalist’ periods, the neo-charismatic leader represents a further 
evolutionary development in the TCP. The neo-charismatic leader type is a younger 
individual when compared with his predecessors and directly engages in violence. 
Zarqawi epitomised this new breed of charismatic leader as young, brash, militant in 
inclination and brutal. If the charismatic leader type is characterised by his/her call to 
‘do as I say’, the neo-charismatic leader type is encapsulated in the phrase of ‘do as I 
do’.  Zarqawi is arguably the most widely recognised neo-charismatic leader of an 
Islamist terrorist group and is believed to have been responsible for a number of 
beheadings in the Iraq conflict, not to mention hundreds of deadly bombings 
throughout the country. Other neo-charismatic leaders include Ibn al-Khattab, who 
operated in Chechnya, and Saleh Awfi and Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, who were both 
from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The neo-charismatic leader, while having his 
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roots in the ‘Modern Period’, is very much emerging as a key feature of the 
‘Globalising World Phase’ of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. Like the 
charismatic leaders who preceded them, this new generation of charismatic leaders 
of Islamist terrorist groups are destined to be used as the charismatic capital for 
subsequent manifestations of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. 
Before concluding this article it is important briefly to mention arguably the 
newest manifestation in the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism and militancy: the 
self-generating mini-group phenomenon. While the ‘07/07’ London bombers are 
arguably the most obvious example of this manifestation, similar terrorist ‘cells’ 
without tangible links to a wider terrorist organisation (e.g. an al-Qaeda or 
Hezbollah) have emerged in Australia, the United Kingdom and even Canada. 
While this evolutionary development in Islamic radicalism and militancy would 
appear to refute the notion of the TCP, or at least signal the fact it has become an 
obsolete method by which to understand this new manifestation, this is incorrect. 
While the charismatic leader acted as the vehicle for the radicalisation process 
throughout the ‘Colonial’, ‘post-Colonial’ and ‘Modern’ periods31, advancements in 
communication technology have enabled individuals to access radical and militant 
Islamist ideology without direct contact with the human source. However, attraction 
to such an ideology, even in absence of the charismatic individual, is reliant upon a 
complex interplay of social, economic, political, cultural and psychological factors 
that create the context in which an individual and collective becomes attracted to an 
ideology32. Hence, a charismatic attraction of sorts emerges for the ideology itself, or 
what I describe as the ‘charisma of ideology’ and it is essentially the same ‘formula’ 
as attraction to a charismatic leader. Therefore, with the emergence of self-generating 
mini-groups, we are witnessing the depersonalisation of charisma. To a large extent the 
‘glue’ that held together the chain of charismatic leaders stretching from the late 
1800s to today was the ‘charisma of ideology’ and technological advancements have 
enabled the depersonalisation of charisma to occur while the TCP phenomenon 
continues. Consequently, while the personnel who made up the radical and militant 
Islamist movements and groups during the colonial period were the new urban 
class, in the post-colonial and modern periods it was primarily the educated middle 
classes, the self-generating mini-group phenomenon is comprised of individuals 
from all walks of life. This trend demonstrates two important facts: firstly, that the 
sources for personnel have been the demographics with the most intense perceptions 
of crisis; and  secondly, that there is a growing perception of crisis which is resulting 
in a more intensified radicalisation and greater propensity towards violence. The 
prospect for security agencies in confronting this new phenomenon will be daunting, 
to say the very least.    
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Conclusion 
While word constraints limited the scope and detail of this paper considerably, its 
primary purpose was to exhibit the effectiveness of the utilisation of the TCP in 
Islamic radicalism and militancy to understand the complex interplay of factors that 
has led to the emergence of increasingly virulent strains of radical and militant 
Islam. From the beginning of the modern Islamist movement to the present, this 
paper traced the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy from the ‘Colonialism 
Period’, through the ‘post-Colonial/Nationalist’ period and into the ‘Modern Period’ 
and ‘Globalising World Phase’. It is evident from mapping the TCP in Islamic 
radicalism and militancy that the process of radicalisation is intimately linked with 
perception of crisis and it is within this context that the charismatic leader emerges. 
The fact that there exists an identifiable chain of charismatic leaders stretching across 
the entire chronology of the modern Islamist movement, and reflecting an increasing 
radicalisation and propensity towards violence with each proceeding leader, 
suggests that the perception of crisis is not only becoming more prevalent, but is 
intensifying. The picture that emerges from this study is of a phenomenon which 
will continue to evolve if the perceptions of crisis within communities of potential 
support are not addressed and alleviated. The laws of ‘cause and effect’ must not be 
abandoned by those whose occupation it is to prevent, confront and combat Islamic 
militants. Indeed, empathy will be a crucial tool in our fight against terrorism in all 
its varied manifestations.  
 
                                                 
1   The  study  of  charismatic  leadership  theory  is  a  complex,  multi‐disciplinary  field  and  space 
considerations will not allow an in‐depth analysis of the field (See Yukl1 1999; House11999; Bass 1988; 
Conger 1988 for discussion of various debates). 
2 Due  to word  constraints,  it will  not  be  possible  to  fully  analyse  and  critique Weber’s  theory  of 
charismatic leadership (for such an analysis see Conger 1988; House 1999; Dowse and Hughes 1982; 
Eisenstadt 1995a; and Willner 1984).  
3 See Shamir 1991. 
4 For details of this approach refer to Shils 1965 and Eisenstadt 1995. 
5 See Shamir (1991, p. 91). 
6 See Freud or Robins and Post for examples of this approach. 
7See Willner 1984; Bryman 1992; and Bradley and Roberts 1988 for examples of this approach. 
8 The notion of a ‘moral panic’ is a perception that certain moral values are being either undermined 
or attacked in a society.  
9 Amtcharisma (‘charisma of office’), Geltilcharisma (charisma of kinship) and Erbcharisma (hereditary 
charisma). I believe that the ‘charisma of ideology’ is a critical addition to this list and certainly plays 
a fundamental role in the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy. 
10 Specifically point 2 of the framework. 
11 Instead see Esposito 1998 and Shepard 2004  
12 Wright‐Neville’s nuanced investigation into the nature of Islamist politics in Southeast Asia focused 
upon  understanding,  ‘…the  attitudinal  dynamics  that  are  leading  Southeast  Asian  and  other 
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Muslims… to see as a  legitimate form of politics individual acts of violence by non‐state actors that 
contravene conventionally accepted notion of just war’ (2004, p. 30). Building upon Sprinzak’s theory 
of delegitmisation, Wright‐Neville categorises a number of Islamist organisations into three categories, 
‘activist’,  ‘militant’  and  ‘terrorist’,  using  both  rhetoric  and  action  as  a measure,  he  categorises  the 
groups, ‘…according to the degree of alienation they evince from the prevailing status quo’ (Wright‐
Neville  2004,  p.  31).  The  purpose  of  Wright‐Neville’s  model  was  to  categorise  those  religious 
adherents already participating  in the political sphere as either activists, militants or  terrorists  (Wright‐
Neville 2004, p. 32) and a  survey of  those who do not participate  in the political sphere was out of  the 
scope of his model. 
13   While  Shepard  (1987)  created  a  typology  of  ‘ideological  orientations’  which  looked  at  the 
relationship  between  the,  ‘…doctrinal  content  of  the  ideologies  and  teachings…’  (1987,  p.  308)  of 
‘secularist’,  ‘Islamic modernist’,  ‘radical  Islamist’,  ‘traditionalist’ and  ‘neo‐traditionalist’ main  types 
and modernity,  his  approach  did  not  explicitly  look  at  the  relationship  between  these  types  and 
propensity  towards violence. Furthermore, his approach did not explicitly delve  into  the process of 
radicalisation which could potentially transform a modernist into a radical and vice versa. 
14   The  categorisations  are  formulated  using  generalised  attitudinal  beliefs  regarding  the  role  of 
selectively literalist interpretations of Islam to the public sphere as the defining criteria. 
15 Terrorist violence refers to the threat or use of violence with the intention of coercing change in the 
political/socio‐cultural realm. My predominant use of the words ‘militant’ and ‘militancy’ are merely 
substitutes for ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’. My hesitancy to over use the term terrorist is the emotional 
connotations  attached  to  them  in  the  post‐9/11  environment.  The  terms  as  they  appear  here  are 
interchangeable.   
16 One of  the  implications of  this  is  that  in  times of perceived crisis, due  to  the absence of a single, 
hierarchical  leadership  elite,  followers  turn  to  those  individuals  from  either  the  umma  or  ulema. 
Without  a  ‘traditional’  or  ‘legal‐rational’  establishment,  it  is  almost  inevitable  that  charismatic 
individuals will emerge.    
17 In fact, many scholars suggest that the stagnation of the Islamic empires in the centuries prior to the 
twentieth century occurred as a result of  the closing of  the doors of  ijtihad, hence  the decline of  the 
Islamic civilisations in the face of Western colonialism and imperialism.  
18 Charismatic leadership of secularist, modernist, radical or militant inclination. 
19 The chain is as follows: Jamal al‐Din al‐Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, Hassan al‐
Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mohammad Qutb  and Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden,  al‐Zarqawi. This 
chain of charismatic leaders, each with tangible links connecting one to the other, stretches from the 
beginning of the modern Islamist movement in the late 1800s into the 21st century and beyond. This 
chain is focused specifically on the sunni chain of the TCP in Islamic radicalism and militancy and is 
the  chain which  leads  to Osama  bin  Laden. However,  it  is  possible  to  utilise  the  TCP  in  Islamic 
radicalism and militancy towards other leaders in the Modern period. 
20 We see in Rida the rationalized process of radicalisation as  illustrated  in the model earlier. Rida’s 
shift is one from ‘modernist’ to ‘radical’. The socio‐historical realities of the period played a massive 
role  in his radicalisation. The socio‐economic, political and socio‐cultural strain of World War I had 
accentuated perceptions of  crisis  in Egypt. Furthermore,  the disintegration of  the Ottoman  empire 
and Egypt’s inability to break from the grip of colonialism had an enormous effect upon those who 
believed that Islam was the key to rejuvenation public hope. 
21  For more on al‐Banna see Hawwa 1985;  Ushama 1995; and Esposito 2002. 
22 In al‐Banna we see the beginnings of the radicalisation process from radical to militant. Although it 
is questionable that he made the transition to completion, he nevertheless created an organisation that 
facilitated this transition in others. 
23 At the height of its popularity, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed a following of almost 500,000. 
24 Again, Qutb is a curious study in that he went from being a rather ‘secular‐modernist’ to a ‘radical‐
militant’ in the course of his life. 
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25 For more on Qutb see Zeidan 2002; Qutb 2002; and Kepel 2003. 
26 While Qutb wrote  a number of  essays on  the Quran his  interest  in  the  text was  from  a  literary 
perspective, not a politico‐religious one.  
27 Qutb’s beloved mother died  in  the early 1940s and a  few years  later his  last  serious  relationship 
ended prior to marriage. These two events had a major catalytic role upon Qutb at first turning to the 
Quran for sentimental (his mother was very pious) and personal comfort.  
28 Afghani, Abduh, Ridah and al‐Banna. 
29 For more on bin Laden see Corbin 2003; Benjamin and Simon 2003; and Bergen 2001. 
30 The chain from Afghani to bin Laden and Zarqawi read as follows: Afghani, Abduh, Rida, al‐Banna, 
Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb, bin Laden and Zarqawi. 
30. The TCP  in  Islamic  radicalism  and militancy has  recently generated  a unique manifestation of 
Islamic  terrorism  which  has  already  proven  to  be  both  deadly  and  hard  to  counter.  While  the 
charismatic  leader  acted  as  the  vehicle  for  change  in  the  earlier  phases  of  the  TCP  in  Islamic 
radicalism and militancy, the July 2005 London Bombers heralded a new era in the phenomenon. The 
emergence of  terrorist  cells with no  tangible  links with  a wider organisation or  charismatic  leader 
signals the materialisation of the ʺself‐generating mini‐groupʺ phenomenon. 
31 In fact, even the ‘Globalising World Phase’. has seen a continuation of the TCP in Islamic radicalism 
and militancy through the charismatic leader, but especially neo‐charismatic leader types. 
32 For example, if the ideology of Abdullah Azzam was read to a group of Evangelist preachers they 
are far less likely to be attracted to this ideology than a group of young, Islamist males from Leeds in 
the United Kingdom. 
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